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《Reasons and Persons》.mobi .pdf .txt
基本信息：
    书名： Reasons and Persons (Oxford Paperbacks)
    作者： Derek Parfit [Parfit, Derek]
    出版社/出版时间： Oxford University Press1984-04-12
    国际标准书号： mobi-asin:77dec438-5192-4dcd-8aeb-2e76c870fd53
    电子版包括 .mobi .pdf .txt等格式：
    《Reasons and Persons》.mobi 文件 1282 KB,
    《Reasons and Persons》.pdf 文件 3842 KB,
    《Reasons and Persons》.txt 文件 1487 KB。
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目录简介：
        PART ONE ? SELF-DEFEATING THEORIES
        CHAPTER 1 ? THEORIES THAT ARE INDIRECTLY SELF-DEFEATING
        1 The Self-interest Theory
        2 How S Can Be Indirectly Self-defeating
        3 Does S Tell Us to Be Never Self-denying?
        4 Why S Does Not Fail in Its Own Terms
        5 Could It Be Rational to Cause Oneself to Act Irrationally?
        6 How S Implies that We Cannot Avoid Acting Irrationally
        7 An Argument for Rejecting S When It Conflicts with Morality
        8 Why This Argument Fails
        9 How S Might Be Self-Effacing
        10 How Consequentialism Is Indirectly Self-defeating
        11 Why C Does Not Fail in Its Own Terms
        12 The Ethics of Fantasy
        13 Collective Consequentialism
        14 Blameless Wrongdoing
        15 Could It Be Impossible to Avoid Acting Wrongly?
        16 Could It Be Right to Cause Oneself to Act Wrongly?
        17 How C Might Be Self-Effacing
        18 The Objection that Assumes Inflexibility
        19 Can Being Rational or Moral Be a Mere Means?
        20 Conclusions
        CHAPTER 2 ? PRACTICAL DILEMMAS
        21 Why C Cannot Be Directly Self-defeating
        22 How Theories Can Be Directly Self-defeating
        23 Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Public Goods
        24 The Practical Problem and its Solutions
        CHAPTER 3 ? FIVE MISTAKES IN MORAL MATHEMATICS
        25 The Share-of-the-Total View
        26 Ignoring the Effects of Sets of Acts
        27 Ignoring Small Chances
        28 Ignoring Small or Imperceptible Effects
        29 Can There Be Imperceptible Harms and Benefits?
        30 Overdetermination
        31 Rational Altruism
        CHAPTER 4 ? THEORIES THAT ARE DIRECTLY SELF-DEFEATING
        32 In Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Does S Fail in Its Own Terms?
        33 Another Weak Defence of Morality
        34 Intertemporal Dilemmas
        35 A Weak Defence of S
        36 How Common-Sense Morality Is Directly Self-Defeating
        37 The Five Parts of a Moral Theory
        38 How We Can Revise Common-Sense Morality so that It Would Not Be Self-Defeating
        39 Why We Ought to Revise Common-Sense Morality
        40 A Simpler Revision
        CHAPTER 5 ? CONCLUSIONS
        41 Reducing the Distance between M and C
        42 Towards a Unified Theory
        43 Work to be Done
        44 Another Possibility
        PART TWO ? RATIONALITY AND TIME
        CHAPTER 6 ? THE BEST OBJECTION TO THE SELF-INTEREST THEORY
        45 The Present-aim Theory
        46 Can Desires Be Intrinsically Irrational, or Rationally Required?
        47 Three Competing Theories
        48 Psychological Egoism
        49 The Self-interest Theory and Morality
        50 My First Argument
        51 The S-Theorist’s First Reply
        52 Why Temporal Neutrality Is Not the Issue Between S and P
        CHAPTER 7 ? THE APPEAL TO FULL RELATIVITY
        53 The S-Theorist’s Second Reply
        54 Sidgwick’s Suggestions
        55 How S Is Incompletely Relative
        56 How Sidgwick Went Astray
        57 The Appeal Applied at a Formal Level
        58 The Appeal Applied to Other Claims
        CHAPTER 8 ? DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TO TIME
        59 Is It Irrational to Give No Weight to One’s Past Desires?
        60 Desires that Depend on Value Judgements or Ideals
        61 Mere Past Desires
        62 Is It Irrational To Care Less About One’s Further Future?
        63 A Suicidal Argument
        64 Past or Future Suffering
        65 The Direction of Causation
        66 Temporal Neutrality
        67 Why We Should Not Be Biased towards the Future
        68 Time’s Passage
        69 An Asymmetry
        70 Conclusions
        CHAPTER 9 ? WHY WE SHOULD REJECT S
        71 The Appeal to Later Regrets