Competence for Waiver of Appeals in the Death Penalty: Timing, Standard and Standing
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《美国精神病学与法律学报》
Competency to Forgo Postconviction Relief in a Death Penalty Case
In Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655 (Ind. 2005), the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling that the defendant was competent to waive review of his murder conviction and denied his request for a dismissal of the appeal court's decision to allow him to pursue postconviction relief (PCR).
Facts of the Case
Joseph E. Corcoran, who had a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, was sentenced to death after conviction for four murders committed in May 1999. He appealed the death sentence but did not challenge the convictions. In March 2003, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the 2002 sentence and denied a petition for a rehearing.
In April 2003, within 30 days of the decision, as required by Indiana law, the state public defender requested that the Indiana Supreme Court extend a stay of execution of the death sentence to petition for PCR. The court granted the request, and, according to procedure, directed the trial court to submit a case management schedule requiring that the petition, signed by the petitioner, Mr. Corcoran, be filed by September 9, 2003.
Mr. Corcoran refused to sign the PCR petition, indicating that he believed that he should be put to death for his crimes and that he wanted to waive any further reviews of his case. On September 9, 2003, the public defender filed with the trial court both the PCR petition without Mr. Corcoran's signature and a request for a competency evaluation of the defendant. The trial court rejected the unsigned PCR petition and scheduled a competency hearing, held in October 2003. In December 2003, the trial court ruled on competency and found Mr. Corcoran competent to waive further challenge to his sentence and to be executed. The state public defender petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court to review the trial court's decision. That court accepted the request, ruling that the public defender had standing to appeal only the competency decision and no other.
While the appeal was before the state supreme court, Mr. Corcoran filed a request to dismiss the appeal on the competency decision because he wanted to recant his waiver and intended to pursue PCR, which would render the issue of his competence to waive PCR moot.
Ruling
The Indiana Supreme Court denied the request to dismiss the appeal of the competency ruling as moot because Mr. Corcoran had not previously filed for PCR within the 30-day deadline and, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the finding that Mr. Corcoran was competent to forgo PCR.
Reasoning
The Indiana Supreme Court addressed the three arguments proffered by the state public defender: (1) the trial court had failed to use the proper competency standard found in Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966), in which the Supreme Court held that a capital defendant may withdraw a petition for certiorari only after it determined whether "he has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises"; (2) Mr. Corcoran was incompetent to waive postconviction review under any competency standard; and (3) Mr. Corcoran's incompetence prevented him from knowingly or voluntarily waiving his right to PCR.
The state argued that the proper standard for determining Mr. Corcoran's competency to waive his right was set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant is competent "if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and has...a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
The Indiana Supreme Court found very little difference between the standards enunciated in Dusky and Rees, citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), which held that the difference between both standards is not readily apparent and may only be one of terminology. The court also noted that federal courts have been unwilling or unable to distinguish between the two standards, as both tests highlight the constitutional necessity that a criminal defendant understand the proceedings and be capable of aiding his legal counsel. The court further ruled that neither test considers the presence or absence of mental illness or brain disorder in itself to be a determinant of competency or incompetency. Both tests require that mental health factors be considered in balance with other evidence. The court considered the trial court's determination of Mr. Corcoran's competency under both standards and affirmed the decision under both.
In response to the petitioner's argument that Mr. Corcoran was unable to form a rational understanding of his decision to waive his challenge of his sentence, the court critiqued the testimony of the three mental health professionals called as defense experts for the competency hearing. All of the experts concluded that Mr. Corcoran suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and had delusions about prison guards torturing him through an ultrasound machine that produced pain and uncontrollable twitching. All three opined that the defendant's decision to forgo PCR was predicated on his desire to be relieved of the pain the torture was producing. The Indiana Supreme Court ruled that the expert testimony about Mr. Corcoran's delusions was inferential, since Mr. Corcoran had made no direct statement about the delusions to the expert witnesses. The court also emphasized that records indicated that the defendant's psychotic symptoms were controlled by medications.
Mr. Corcoran's testimony to the trial court played a critical role in the state supreme court's decision. The supreme court found that Mr. Corcoran spoke directly to his reasons for not pursuing PCR when he stated
[I want to] waive my appeals because I am guilty of murder... . I should be executed for what I have done and not because I am supposedly tortured with ultrasound... . I believe the death penalty is a just punishment for four counts of murder, and I believe that I should be executed since I am guilty... .
The court also reviewed records that indicated that Mr. Corcoran was aware of his legal position and the consequences of his decision to forgo any further PCR. The court concluded that his awareness of his legal position and his ability to formulate a rational justification for forgoing further PCR rendered him competent under either the Dusky or Rees standard.
The supreme court considered the issue of automatic PCR in cases in which defendants refuse to endorse the petition and concluded that automatic review on direct appeal had been afforded Mr. Corcoran and that interest in achieving finality outweighed the benefits of mandating further review. It declined to extend automatic PCR to capital litigants who fail to seek PCR within the time limits set forth by the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Justice Rucker dissented, finding the court's reliance on Mr. Corcoran's statements concerning his waiver of PCR flawed, based on the experts’ observation that he was reluctant to admit to having a psychiatric illness.
Discussion
Competency determination in complex cases challenges the forensic psychiatrist as well as the judicial system, in part because of the complexities of the variously applied legal standards for competency. In this case, the public defender argued that the trial court had inappropriately applied the Dusky instead of the Rees standard in determining Mr. Corcoran's competency to forgo PCR. The court, however, concluded that there was no substantive difference between the two standards and that the defendant had met criteria for competence under both.
It is interesting that not all of the justices agreed. Justice Rucker argued that the ability to consult with one's lawyer and to have an understanding of the legal proceedings against one as outlined in Dusky is not quite the same as the ability to make a rational choice as outlined in Rees. He further argued that even if the two tests were indistinguishable, the fundamental requirement underlying any notion of competency must still be one of rationality.
Justice Rucker's position is understandable to forensic psychiatrists. The capacity to make a rational choice free from the intrusion of delusional beliefs is substantively different from understanding proceedings and consulting with an attorney when delusions are present. The Rees standard offers a broader model than does the Dusky for examining an inmate's mental capacity, because it addresses rational decision making.
All three mental health professionals in the current case based their conclusions on whether Mr. Corcoran's mental illness affected his ability to make a rational choice, even though his capacity to understand and to consult was intact. An irrational analysis or purpose within a rational plan is one of the complex characteristics of a paranoid disorder. It is often that characteristic that challenges explanation in state-of-mind defenses when, for a delusional reason, the defendant has carried out a well-orchestrated plan. As evident in this case, that same paranoid characteristic complicates the assessment of competency. Of course, the ultimate complication is that Mr. Corcoran's was a capital case, in which the finality of the decisions and the action is absolute.
In Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655 (Ind. 2005), the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling that the defendant was competent to waive review of his murder conviction and denied his request for a dismissal of the appeal court's decision to allow him to pursue postconviction relief (PCR).
Facts of the Case
Joseph E. Corcoran, who had a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, was sentenced to death after conviction for four murders committed in May 1999. He appealed the death sentence but did not challenge the convictions. In March 2003, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the 2002 sentence and denied a petition for a rehearing.
In April 2003, within 30 days of the decision, as required by Indiana law, the state public defender requested that the Indiana Supreme Court extend a stay of execution of the death sentence to petition for PCR. The court granted the request, and, according to procedure, directed the trial court to submit a case management schedule requiring that the petition, signed by the petitioner, Mr. Corcoran, be filed by September 9, 2003.
Mr. Corcoran refused to sign the PCR petition, indicating that he believed that he should be put to death for his crimes and that he wanted to waive any further reviews of his case. On September 9, 2003, the public defender filed with the trial court both the PCR petition without Mr. Corcoran's signature and a request for a competency evaluation of the defendant. The trial court rejected the unsigned PCR petition and scheduled a competency hearing, held in October 2003. In December 2003, the trial court ruled on competency and found Mr. Corcoran competent to waive further challenge to his sentence and to be executed. The state public defender petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court to review the trial court's decision. That court accepted the request, ruling that the public defender had standing to appeal only the competency decision and no other.
While the appeal was before the state supreme court, Mr. Corcoran filed a request to dismiss the appeal on the competency decision because he wanted to recant his waiver and intended to pursue PCR, which would render the issue of his competence to waive PCR moot.
Ruling
The Indiana Supreme Court denied the request to dismiss the appeal of the competency ruling as moot because Mr. Corcoran had not previously filed for PCR within the 30-day deadline and, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the finding that Mr. Corcoran was competent to forgo PCR.
Reasoning
The Indiana Supreme Court addressed the three arguments proffered by the state public defender: (1) the trial court had failed to use the proper competency standard found in Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966), in which the Supreme Court held that a capital defendant may withdraw a petition for certiorari only after it determined whether "he has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises"; (2) Mr. Corcoran was incompetent to waive postconviction review under any competency standard; and (3) Mr. Corcoran's incompetence prevented him from knowingly or voluntarily waiving his right to PCR.
The state argued that the proper standard for determining Mr. Corcoran's competency to waive his right was set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant is competent "if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and has...a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
The Indiana Supreme Court found very little difference between the standards enunciated in Dusky and Rees, citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), which held that the difference between both standards is not readily apparent and may only be one of terminology. The court also noted that federal courts have been unwilling or unable to distinguish between the two standards, as both tests highlight the constitutional necessity that a criminal defendant understand the proceedings and be capable of aiding his legal counsel. The court further ruled that neither test considers the presence or absence of mental illness or brain disorder in itself to be a determinant of competency or incompetency. Both tests require that mental health factors be considered in balance with other evidence. The court considered the trial court's determination of Mr. Corcoran's competency under both standards and affirmed the decision under both.
In response to the petitioner's argument that Mr. Corcoran was unable to form a rational understanding of his decision to waive his challenge of his sentence, the court critiqued the testimony of the three mental health professionals called as defense experts for the competency hearing. All of the experts concluded that Mr. Corcoran suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and had delusions about prison guards torturing him through an ultrasound machine that produced pain and uncontrollable twitching. All three opined that the defendant's decision to forgo PCR was predicated on his desire to be relieved of the pain the torture was producing. The Indiana Supreme Court ruled that the expert testimony about Mr. Corcoran's delusions was inferential, since Mr. Corcoran had made no direct statement about the delusions to the expert witnesses. The court also emphasized that records indicated that the defendant's psychotic symptoms were controlled by medications.
Mr. Corcoran's testimony to the trial court played a critical role in the state supreme court's decision. The supreme court found that Mr. Corcoran spoke directly to his reasons for not pursuing PCR when he stated
[I want to] waive my appeals because I am guilty of murder... . I should be executed for what I have done and not because I am supposedly tortured with ultrasound... . I believe the death penalty is a just punishment for four counts of murder, and I believe that I should be executed since I am guilty... .
The court also reviewed records that indicated that Mr. Corcoran was aware of his legal position and the consequences of his decision to forgo any further PCR. The court concluded that his awareness of his legal position and his ability to formulate a rational justification for forgoing further PCR rendered him competent under either the Dusky or Rees standard.
The supreme court considered the issue of automatic PCR in cases in which defendants refuse to endorse the petition and concluded that automatic review on direct appeal had been afforded Mr. Corcoran and that interest in achieving finality outweighed the benefits of mandating further review. It declined to extend automatic PCR to capital litigants who fail to seek PCR within the time limits set forth by the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Justice Rucker dissented, finding the court's reliance on Mr. Corcoran's statements concerning his waiver of PCR flawed, based on the experts’ observation that he was reluctant to admit to having a psychiatric illness.
Discussion
Competency determination in complex cases challenges the forensic psychiatrist as well as the judicial system, in part because of the complexities of the variously applied legal standards for competency. In this case, the public defender argued that the trial court had inappropriately applied the Dusky instead of the Rees standard in determining Mr. Corcoran's competency to forgo PCR. The court, however, concluded that there was no substantive difference between the two standards and that the defendant had met criteria for competence under both.
It is interesting that not all of the justices agreed. Justice Rucker argued that the ability to consult with one's lawyer and to have an understanding of the legal proceedings against one as outlined in Dusky is not quite the same as the ability to make a rational choice as outlined in Rees. He further argued that even if the two tests were indistinguishable, the fundamental requirement underlying any notion of competency must still be one of rationality.
Justice Rucker's position is understandable to forensic psychiatrists. The capacity to make a rational choice free from the intrusion of delusional beliefs is substantively different from understanding proceedings and consulting with an attorney when delusions are present. The Rees standard offers a broader model than does the Dusky for examining an inmate's mental capacity, because it addresses rational decision making.
All three mental health professionals in the current case based their conclusions on whether Mr. Corcoran's mental illness affected his ability to make a rational choice, even though his capacity to understand and to consult was intact. An irrational analysis or purpose within a rational plan is one of the complex characteristics of a paranoid disorder. It is often that characteristic that challenges explanation in state-of-mind defenses when, for a delusional reason, the defendant has carried out a well-orchestrated plan. As evident in this case, that same paranoid characteristic complicates the assessment of competency. Of course, the ultimate complication is that Mr. Corcoran's was a capital case, in which the finality of the decisions and the action is absolute.